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DISCUSSION AND REPORTS.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WILL.
A recent article by A. Pfander from the Psychological Seminary
of Munich offers a detailed criticism of several modern attempts to
analyze the inner experience of will-action (Das Bewusstsein des Wol-
lens, Zeitschrift fur Psychologies Vol. 18, pp. 321-367). It was my
attributed duty and, at the first reading, also my intention to •write an
objective report of this careful essay; but at the second reading 1
changed my intention and the editor was kind enough to reconsider after
that also my duty. An article, the arguments of which follow, criti-
cally, the arguments of others, can hardly be reported without repeat-
ing not only the critic's, but also the criticised discussions, and that
would lead us too far into detail. Thus it may be sufficient to report
that the author rejects every analysis which tries to exclude a special
will element, that is, which reduces the will to a complex of sensations.
The final word leads to the theory of Lipps, who gives to the will its
fundamental place.
Instead of a further abstract of the paper, it may be allowed to me
to mention a few points in the defense of my little book on the will
(Die Willenshandlung, 1889), the criticism of which makes up the
first half of Pfander's paper, the second half being devoted to James,
Kuelpe, Ribot. Baldwin, Wundt and Lipps. I wish to mention a few
points in which Pfander misunderstands my meaning, and, above all,
I wish to add a general word about the whole question, a word which
I have had for a long time on my lips, especially since Mr. Seth and
others have chosen that first essay of mine as the whipping-boy of phy-
siological psychology.
I have tried to show that we can decompose the psychical facts of
the will into elements which are by principle coordinated with the ele-
ments of the idea and that the most essential r61e belongs to the fact
of anticipation. The fact that an end is anticipated before it is reached
by our own activity makes up a chief characteristic of the will, as only
that anticipation of the end allows associations about its consequences
and thus the stopping of the possible action through the inhibitory
function of the association. I showed how also in the case of inner
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will-action the result is determined by the anticipation, and how the
so-called innervation-feeling is in the same way the anticipation of the
movement sensations which will result from the action.
Pfander first denies some of my facts. He does not allow that, if
we try to remember an idea, the idea itself precedes the inner action
which brings about the reproduction. Of course, if we try to remem-
ber a name, the name itself is not in consciousness, but, as I said in my
book, an x which is given in such relations to other ideas that it can
be only the sought name. Pfander says: The idea is present or is not
present; an acknowledgment of such an # as substitute destroys the
theory. He does not see that such substitute, which is of course quite
different from the idea itself in regard to its sensational structure, is
perfectly identical with it in regard to its associations, and that for my
whole theory this side alone is essential. If x can awake and inhibit
the same associations and actions as the concrete idea, its existence is
an anticipation of the idea in the only respect in which it was in ques-
tion, namely, as the center of functional relations. I think he is
more correct in another point. He says that the innervation-feeling
which accompanies inner activities is not an anticipation of later ac-
tions, because such actions are not produced. That is true, but I
should say, it does not militate against my theory of innervation-feelings
because that accompaniment of inner activity is hardly felt as feeling
of innervation, it is felt merely as feeling of activity which only by its
fusion with the characteristic succession of ideas becomes part of a
will act.
Pfander misinterprets, secondly, some parts of my discussion by
taking the conception of anticipation too narrow. I did not mean
only that the memory image comes before the perception, but that it
comes before the perception with a feeling of relation to the future.
It is anticipated as something which will be realized in the future.
This feeling of reference to the future includes not the slightest voli-
tion, it is merely the feeling that preparation for its appearance is still
possible; in other words, it is the sensational accompaniment of a
special set of preparatory motor adjustments. In the same way it is
no objection that our will to act can exist without the later realization
of the anticipated motion; we have then will, but not a will-action.
In such a case we have the anticipation of an effect thought as realized in
the future and the anticipation of the feeling of the action which brings
about such effect together with the inhibition of all ideas which would
produce antagonistic actions; whether under these circumstances the
action really results or is stopped by an outer obstacle, is without con-
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sequences for the feeling of volition. I did not pay much attention to
this case, as my book was especially devoted not to the will, but to the
willed action. The deciding point remains also here that the active
will can be decomposed into a system of passively felt, not actively
willed elements.
But just upon this general point is the real bearing of Pfander's
whole criticism; all the previous special discussions are secondary.
If all the claimed sensations were given together by outer influences,
for instance by electrical stimulation of the different nervous parts, we
could never understand how they can form that consciousness of activity
which characterizes the real will. A man in such a case, Pfander
says, would feel that something is happening to him, that a compli-
cated surprising cramp has attacked his body, but he would not believe
that he himself is doing something. It would seem perhaps a sufficient
answer that as long as such artificial synthesis is not made experimen-
tally, it is not essential whether we can understand the result or not;
those who have never heard that a stereoscope really exists, would be
probably not less skeptical about the claim that the perception of two
flat pictures gives the impression of one plastic object.
But such an answer would be misleading. Pfander's criticism,
which coincides here fully with that of Seth and scores of others, is
not to be rejected because we can show that our psychological analysis
is right, but above all because we have never claimed for our analysis
what they criticise. My critics ought to show that my analysis of the
psychological facts of the will is incorrect, and, instead of that, they
show only that the analysis of the psychological facts is not a descrip-
tion of the real will. But who in the world has pretended that it is?
I analyze the contents of consciousness which I find as soon as I trans-
form the will into a complex of psychological phenomena, and they
cry behind me: Stop thief; the real will is primarily not given as a
content of consciousness which you find as describable object but as
something which you must feel and will as your active function. Of
course, such active function it is; only as such—it is not a phenomenon
and therefore not describable and explainable, and if you want it as
object of psychology, that is, of the science which describes and ex-
plains mental life, you must transform mental life into a set of objects
and substitute in that service the psycho-physical personality for the
real center of subjective functions.
To quote my own words from a recent paper, I may say once
more : " As soon as the psychologist enters into the study of the will, he
has absolutely to abstract from the fact that a complicated substitution
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is the presupposition for his work. He has now to consider the wil.
as if it were really composed of sensational elements and as if his
analysis discovered them. * • * There is nothing more absurd than to
blame the psychologist because his account of the will does not do
justice to the whole reality of it, and to believe that it is a climax of
forcible arguments against the atomizing psychology of to-day if
philosophers exclaim that there is no real will at all in those compounds
of sensations which the psychologist substitutes. Certainly not, as it
was just the presupposition of psychology to abstract from that real
will. It is not wiser than to cast up against the physicist that his
moving atoms do not represent the physical world because they have
no color and sound and smell. If they sounded and smelled still, the
physicist would not have fulfilled his purpose." {Atlantic Monthly,
May, 1898, p. 613.)
Of course, this may appear as a postscriptum. But my critics
have no right to quarrel with me; I have never hidden my views and
I have not essentially changed them. I have not only my students as
•witnesses that I have for many years characterized the r61e of psychol-
ogy in this way, but I can call the little book itself to the stand. To
be sure, I have always held the opinion that a monograph on a special
subject has not the duty to report the author's views of all other things
in the world. When I wrote an essay on the will as psychophysio-
logical process, I did not feel obliged to discuss also the will in so far
as it is a factor in the real world. I thought it sufficient to emphasize
in the beginning that I was there not dealing with the will in so far as
it is object of epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and practical re-
ality, I wished to consider it only in that unreal transformation in
which it belongs to psychology. To make my meaning perfectly
clear, I ended the whole book by the words: " The will is an explain-
able complex of sensations seen from a psychophysical standpoint, but
the deepest mystery seen from the standpoint of metaphysical reality."
How much emotion my friends would have saved if they had taken
the trouble to read not only the half of the sentence, but the whole!
I confess I should not write to-day the closing sentence as I did
there ten years ago. I should avoid calling the ultimate reality a
metaphysical one as there is no other reality while the world of physi-
cal and psychical phenomena is unreal. And I should still less call it
a mystery, as this expression means that it is unexplained while it ought
to be explained; I should say to-day that it is unexplained and unex-
plainable only in so far as the categories of explaining sciences, that
is of physics and psychology, are applied to it, but, as the real will be-
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longs to a subjectifying system to which the categories of the objectify-
ing sciences do not apply, the question whether it can be explained
does not come up at all. It is beyond causality, as it is beyond space
or weight. An explanation would have no meaning for it, it must be
interpreted and appreciated, not described and explained, but it is
not, therefore, mysterious. I should thus prefer to close my book with
the words: " The will is a describable and explainable complex of
sensations if it is thought as transformed into a psychophysical phe-
nomenon; this analysis, on the other hand, cannot say anything about
the real will which belongs to the primary world, the more as this
transformation of the real world into a describable system is itself a
function of the real will."
Perhaps my critics would say here, that this escape to epistemo-
logical questions does not help the fate of my theory, as even then, when
the task of the psychological analysis is reduced to this secondary
treatment, we have to debate whether the elements of this unreal
world are sensations only, that is, elements of ideas, or also volitions
which cannot be coordinated with ideational elements. But I am
convinced that even in this point the matter has to be handed over to
epistemology, and all the psychophysical family quarrels about the
muscle sensations and so on do not count much till we understand
what we intend in general by our psychophysical research. We may
debate about the ways which lead to the goal, but it is meaningless to
discuss whether we ought to approach the goal or to depart from it.
Is it really only a specialistic caprice when some psychologists try
to decompose all mental life into such elements only as are possible
elements of ideas ? Is it not rather the mere consequence of the presup-
positions which constitute psychology ? To be sure, in the detailed
work, it is not necessary that the specialist remains always conscious of
the epistemological purposes which give to his science logical value
and meaning, but if he is doubtful about the general direction, he must
look for his orientation indeed to the philosophical principles.
Psychology has nothing to do with interpretation and appreciation ;
it seeks to describe and to explain mental phenomena. It presupposes,
therefore, that mental life is by principle describable. Description de-
mands decomposition into elements and fixation of the elements for the
purpose of communication. There is no description without commu-
nication, but mental states are never, and under no circumstances,
directly communicable. We can awake and suggest mental facts
in others, but we can never share a mental fact with others. Di-
rectly communicable is only the physical world which is the world
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of common experience. We can communicate mental states, there-
fore, only indirectly, by connecting psychical experiences with the
physical world; there was never a psychical fact which was communi-
cated otherwise. This connection with physical facts for the purpose
of fixation in the service of communication can pass, of course,
through many stages, from the most indefinite popular reference to
physical objects and situations to the most exact connection with meas-
ured physical processes, but there is no escape from the physical con-
nection. It is, therefore, absurd to think that the relation of mind to
body, of psychical to physical facts, comes in play only as soon as the
explanation of the facts begins; no, the simplest description has its
ultimate basis in the reference to communicable physical facts. In
ordinary life we connect the whole mental state with a reference to a
physical situation as a whole; in psychology we seek the determining
physical connections for the distinguishable psychical parts, but the
principle is the same.
But every science presupposes that its aim can be reached with
ideal completeness, and it is its duty to transform the objects in thought
till the ideal fulfillment of the purpose is at least thinkable. In its
preparatory stages psychology finds plenty of possibilities from which
it can select in connecting psychical and physical facts; for in-
stance, the mental fact and its physical cause or its physical
effect or its physical accompaniment and so on. Each of these pos-
sibilities has its importance for some stage of psychology, but no
one can represent the final stage, as no one allows an episte-
mologically ideal connection. There exists only one connection be-
tween psychical and physical facts which is independent of empirical
observations and of empirical confirmation, the relation between the
psychical idea and the physical object which is meant by the idea.
This relation stands high beyond empirical chance because it is based
on epistemological identity; those two experiences are in reality one
which has become double only from a twofold way of looking at it.
The idea is thus the only mental state which can be communicated
and described by a connection which is logically necessary. If all
mental states were ideas, the description would be easy. On the
other hand, a mental state which cannot be described after the scheme
of the description of ideas can never be perfectly described.
Psychology of the feelings, emotions, judgments, volitions would
remain thus on a lower level of description if one possibility was not
open. The ideas which correspond to the physical objects show dis-
criminable parts; these parts may be called sensations and the sensa-
DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 645
tions stand thus to the factors of the physical object in the same log-
ically ideal relation in which the ideas stand to the whole objects.
Emotions and volitions are not ideas, but if they were complexes of
elements which are possible elements of ideas, that is, sensations, then
their elements would be describable and they themselves thus describ-
able in terms of their elements. Emotions and volitions can be com-
municated only if they are complexes of sensations, and therefore, as
psychology has its aim in describing all mental facts, psychology has
the duty to transform these states till they are represented by a com-
plex of possible elements of ideas. To the instinctive service of this
duty the well-known theories about the structure of emotions arose,
and in this service I wrote my book on the Will.
The leading aim of the book, which is for Mr. Seth an ' ingenious
caricature,' is then just as valid for me to-day as ten years ago. Of
course I see to-day many details, especially about the feelings, other-
wise than in my first essay, and with this in mind I said once jokingly
in print that it was the product of guileless adolescence. But if Mr.
Douglas in a kind defense against Mr. Seth's attacks pats me on the
back and repeats the excuse of my youth as if I had given up the
principle of the treatment, I must decline the defense. I should
change to-day details, but the principle that the will, as soon as it is
transformed into a psychophysical object, must be thought as a com-
plex of sensations, was independent of the bold aggressiveness of my
' adolescence' and is still my present belief while " I am grown peace-
ful as old age to-night."
HUGO MONSTERBERG.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
WHAT IS A PSYCHICAL FACT ?
In the September number of the Educational Review Professor
Miinsterberg announces that " the psychical fact as such is for philo-
sophical reasons just as undescribable as it is unmeasurable, since it is
the object which by principle exists for one only and which remains,
therefore, ever incommunicable." It will be remembered that in his
articles in the Atlantic Professor Munsterberg used this theory of the
nature of mental facts as the chief prop to his thesis that the phenom-
ena with which psychology deals can not be studied or talked about
under the headings time, space and energy. It seems time for some
one to join issue with him on this epistemological question, one of
vital importance to general method in psychology, especially since he
